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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 
ty 
D. F. HEISEL 
This paper will explore some of the implications 
of demographic trends for educational needs in a 
developing society such as Kenya. Attention will be 
rather narrowly focussed on this single relationship? 
broader economic considerations have been dealt with 
elsewhere in the literature and need not be repeated 
here.* 
The discussion will begin with a review of the 
outlines of Kenya's existing demographic characteristics. 
These are reasonably well known and are quite sufficiently 
accurate for the analysis that will be presented here.** 
Then, the dynamics of the age distribution of a human 
population will be considered. This topic will be more 
fully explored as the demographic characteristic with the 
greatest direct relevance for educational needs and policy. 
Finally, the age distribution will be briefly explored. 
Kenya's 9-odd million people are very unevenly 
distributed through its territory. Despite the fact that 
urban concentrations are few and small, bjr world standards, 
there are very great differences in densitj?
-
 of population 
between regions. Furthermore, given the low level of 
urbanization, Kenya as a whole is by no means a thinly 
populated country. The gross density of 15 persons per 
square kilometer is about the same figure as found in 
Sweden. It is 50 percent higher than the density of the 
USSR and just 25 percent lower than that of the US. 
Kenya's density is, of course, very much higher than those 
found in wealthy industrial-agricultural countries such 
as Australia, Canada or New Zealand. On the other hand, 
Kenya is indeed much less densely populated than the 
crowded industrial countries of Europe or the congested 
nations of South Asia.*** 
A useful-summary, for example, can be found in 
A. Coale, "Population and Economic Development," 
in P. Ha Us er, ed., The Population Dilemma, Prentice 
Hall, 1963. 
Full results will not be available until the analysis 
of the 1962 Census is published. In the meantime, we 
shall depend on fragmentary reports as those presented 
in D. Etherington, "Projected Changes in Urban and 
Rural Population in Kenya..." included as a paper for 
this Conference. 
It is perhaps more pertinent to consider density in a 
predominantly agricultural country such as Kenya in 
terms of rural population in relation to-arable land. 
Using simply figures reported by the FAO, Kenya appears 
to be relatively crowded. With a rural population of 
450 persons per k m
2
 of land presently defined as arable, 
Kenya reaches a figure just less than twice that for 
Uganda (228). All other reported countries in Eastern 
Africa have rural population densities on arable land 
less than Uganda's. Reported in Economic Commission 
for Africa, "The Demographic Situation in Eastern 
Africa," E/CN.14/LU/ECOP/2, July, 1965. 
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The force of mortality has been steadily 
slackening in Kenya in recent years. On the basis of 
1962 census returns, the crude death rate was estimated 
to be about 20 deaths per thousand living persons per 
2/ear. Prom these and other data, an expectation of 
life at birt il Of 3 ppi*OX imately 45 years can be inferred. 
This is still a comparatively high level of mortality -
a death rate about double those typically found in the 
industrialized couhtries. However, there is also clear 
evidence of a sustained decline. Expectation of life 
at birth may well be rising by as much as 6 months per 
year. 
In contrast, fertility shows no evidence of 
having moved either up or down. With an estimated crude 
birth rate of about 50 per thousand, Kenya's fertility 
is among the higher found in the world today. The 
estimated birth rate corresponds to an average completed 
family size of just less than 7 births per woman. 
(Interestingly, fertility seems, with one exception, to 
reach maximum levels in the most densely populated areas 
of the country. It is highest in the Western part of 
Kenyas South and Central Nyanza and the Western Region. 
Among the thickly populated sections, only Central 
Province shows slightly more moderate levels of fertility. 
It is lowest along the Coast.) 
As in most countries In the modern world, migration 
across international boundaries is of relatively slight 
demographic importance. Nor is there reason to anticipate 
any noteable increase. Neither large scale movements of 
people in or out can be reasonably expected. Internal 
movement seems to be substantial but it does not have 
any direct effect on population growth. It is relevant 
only in so far as it has an influence on fertility or 
mortality. 
The combined effects of fertility, mortality, and 
migration have produced in Kenya a very young average age. 
Just a little less than half of the population consists 
of children less than 15 years of age. At the same time, 
the proportion in the older ages, say 60 or more years, 
is very small. It is not likely to be much over 5 
percent. This age distribution is typical of the less 
developed countries and is in sharp contrast to the urban 
industrial nations. In the latter, one is likely to find 
something like a quarter of the population 0 to 14 and 
considerabljT- higher proportions in the older ages. 
Finally, the rate of population increase in Kenya 
is currently very close to 3 percent per year. The 
unimportance of migration makes this rate largely a 
result of the high level of fertility and the moderate 
level of mortality. The rate Is among the higher found 
in the world today. It Implies a doubling of the 
population about every 24 years. Again, the contrast 
vtfith the urban-industrial nations is sharply marked. In 
Northern and Western Europe populations tend to grow at 
about 1 percent per year? in Eastern and Southern Europe 
(and in Japan) the rate is even lower. 
Por the present, the trends of fertility, mortality, 
and migration appear to be unlikely to change very much. 
Since migration will probably remain a minor factor, 
fertility and mortality will continue to be the significant 
determinants of population growth and the age distribution 
/in Kenya. 
- 3 -
in Kenya. Mortality will almost certainljr decline 
further. Experience in comparable countries suggests 
that a further decline of perhaps 25 percent or more 
in the crude death rate can be brought about through the 
continued application of existing medical practices 
and facilities. In other words, further gains in health 
are available through public health programmes (particularly 
in preventive medicine) using existing medical technology 
and without the introduction of the very expensive 
curative facilities characteristic of the most advanced 
medical practice found in the wealthiest urban-industrial 
countries. Moreover, these latter medical procedures 
will themselves also, without doubt, continue to expand. 
On the other hand, the existing patterns and level 
of fertility gives little reason to expect any change 
without the intervention of some new exogenous factors. 
The birthrate cannot rise very much from its present 
level? it is only in rather special circumstances that 
numbers as high as 60 per-thousand are achieved. For a 
whole national population, 55 seems to be a rough 
realistic maximum. Thus, a 10 percent rise in the 
birthrate is about as much as is possible. (It is worth 
noting, though, that some rise might well occur. If 
health conditions continue to improve, more women will 
survive further into their childbearing years, childbearing 
itself will become less hazardous, and the incidence of 
sterility and sub-fecundity will decline. Any of these 
could lead to higher fertility.) 
A reduction in ferlity is equally unlikely, if 
there is no introduction of any new factors. Barring a 
disastrous and unforseen rise in mortalitjr, a significant 
fertility decline can come only as a result of a reduction 
in the amount of time individuals - especially women - are 
exposed to the risk of conception or of an increase in 
the use of measures to prevent births. More simply 
stated, childbearing will decline only if people engage 
in less sexual intercourse or* if they take steps so that 
intercourse doesn't result in a birth. The former could 
result from a rise in the average age at marriage or 
from a radical alteration of the structure of the family. 
Neither of these seems especially likely. 
The wider use of measures to prevent births is 
similarly unlikely, without the intervention of outside 
influence. These measures would take one or more of 
three forms of birth limitations sterilization, abortion, 
or contraception. Sterilization is not uncommon in Kenya 
but has usually been restricted in its use to situations 
where further childbearing would be medically dangerous to 
a woman. (This statement does not apply with full accuracy 
to the Asian population, but since Asians are demographically 
unimportant the qualification can be ignored.) There is 
no evidence to indicate that sterilization will acquire 
more than medical importance for the majority of the 
population. Therefore, it is unlikely to effect the 
course of fertility in Kenya. 
It is not possible to speak with quite such 
assurance about the future course of abortion. In recent 
years many societies in many parts of the world have 
experienced a rapid upsurge in the use of this means to 
prevent births. There is no justification for asserting 
flatly that a similar trend could not develop in Kenya." 
Research currently in progress indicates the knowledge of 
how to induce an abortion is widespread through the 
/population 
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population of this country. There is no way of estimating 
accurately the current incidence, though the very high level 
of fertility indicates that the rate cannot be extremely high. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that abortion is generally 
illegal, dangerous (especially given the methods most 
commonly known), and contrary to commonly accepted values. 
Of course, there are by no means unassailable barriers to a 
change in the rate. However, there is no evidence just now 
of rising incidence of abortion of such a magnitude as to 
substantially lower fertility. 
In most countries currently experiencing a decline 
in fertility (as well as those where fertility Is already 
low) contractption is playing a mojor role. In Kenya, however, 
practice of contraception is still very infrequent. This state 
of affairs will probably continue in the near future. 
Incomplete results of research in progress show that knowledge 
of effective modern contraceptives is extremely scanty. (There 
seems to be widespread demand for more information about 
contraception and greater availability of facilities in rural 
Kenya, though.) However, unless a broad programme-of education 
and encouragement in family planning is introduced, it is 
difficilt to see how any significant change can take place in 
the near term. 
Taking probable trends in migration, mortality, and 
fertility into account, it is clear that Kenya's present high 
rate of population growth is likely to continue in the near 
future. Indeed, if mortality falls at an expected pace, the 
rate of population growth vjill rise substantially. 
With these prospects in view, it will be useful to 
try to determine what the implications are for the specifically 
educational needs of the society. In order to do so, we shall 
consider the impact on the age distribution of trends in 
mortality and fertility which might plausibly be expected in 
a population such as Kenya's. The age distribution is the 
appropriate point of focus since it determines the limits of 
demand for education. That is, the age distribution specifies 
the number of young people who can possibly enter into any 
formal educational process as well as their numbers relative 
to those in other age groups. 
This is a problem of acute significance in a 
developing country where the average age is low, as in Kenya. 
Not only is the economy confronted with the heavy demands of 
constructing a new educational institution (whatever the 
curriculum), it also must carry out this development with 
extraordinarily larger numbers of clients relative to the 
size of the total population. And all this must be done 
in the face of competing imperative demands for scarce capital. 
The analysis can best be carried out by means of the 
stable population model. By this means it is possible to 
infer the implicit age distribution'of any population 
essentially unaffected by migration, given any levels of 
mortality and fertility.* What will be done here is to 
/examine 
The model was originally developed by A.J. Lotka and 
reported in his paper "On the True Rate of Natural Increase," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vole 20, 
Sept. lQ25o It•has"more recently been extended and amplified 
in, for example, J. Bourgeois-Pichat, "Ut isation de la 
Notion de Population Stable pour Mesurer la Mortalite et la 
Pecondite des Populations des Pays Sous-Developpes," Bullet in 
d_e 1' Inst it ut e Int erna_t iona 1 de Statist ique, Vol.36, 195b, 
"and A„ Coale and PT'Pemeny,' RegiFnaTlCoclei Life Tables and 
Stable Populations, Princeton, ±36b. Tor~the present analysis, 
the Females North~model life table was adopted from the Coale-
Demeny volume. 
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examine the age distributions that will result from the 
various kinds of changes that could be reasonably anticipated 
in Kenya. The examination will provide a picture of the 
implications of demographic trends apart from historical 
accidents. 
Table 1 indicates that in a-stable population that 
is increasing at 3 percent per year, with an expectation of 
life at birth of 45 years' for females, and a gross reproduc-
tion rate of 3.5 (that is, an average completed family size 
of just slightly less'than 7.0 children) we would expect to 
find a birthrate of 49.7 and a death rate of 19.7. The 
percent under age 15 should be 46.7. This is indeed a very 
nice fit with the empirical estimates for Kenya. There are 
undoubtedly minor discrepancies. These might result from 
some of the parameters assumed for purposes of constructing 
the model. However, an even greater source of discrepancies 
are the inaccuracies in the empirical estimates. In any 
case, they are trivial in magnitude and do not effect any 
conclusions we might draw. 
let us now see what happens with an improvement in 
mortality. If-the expectation of life at birth goes from 
45 to 55 years, an increase of about' 22 percent, the rate 
of population growth rises to about 3.6 percent per year. 
That implies doubling of the population in just less than 
20 years. The crude birth rate declines by merely one point 
(as a result of an increase in the number, of years lived on 
the average by members of the population). However, the most 
interesting and important point is that the age distribution 
alters but little. Indeed, changes in mortality in general 
have only a very slight effect on the age distribution. The 
shifts in the age distribution which do occur increase the 
proportion in the younger years, Further increases in 
expectation of life at birth continues the observed trends 
and do not alter the conclusions in any way. 
Gains in longevity are a universally supreme social 
value. Furthermore, they have a direct economic impact on 
development by increasing the efficiency of education. In a 
society with moderate to high mortality, a substantial 
proportion of those born are quickly lost. Hence, invest-
ments of any sort made in these children are also lost. 
Thus, in-a society with an expectation of life at birth of 
45 years, about 13 children out of every 100 born will not 
survive to their first birthday and some 10 more will die 
before reaching age 5. Where expectation of life at birth 
has reached 65 years, only about 5 will die before age 1 and 
just 2 more before age 5. Affecting the efficiency of formal 
education in a society with an expectation of-birth of 45? 
of every 100 children who do survive to age 5? about 5 will 
die before the age of 15, about 23 before the age of 40, 
and only some 57 will reach the end of their working years at 
age 60. If the expectation of life at birth has reached 65 
years, some 98 percent of those surviving the age of 5 will 
be alive to enter-the labour force at age 15, 91 percent 
will reach age 40, and 78 percent will remain at age 60. 
These are real and significant•gains. When 
unaccompanied by declines in fertility, though, gains in 
longevity carry with them certain costs. Not only does the 
rate of population increase rise - possibly to extreme levels -
but the age distribution shifts to an even slightly more 
disadvantageous form. The burden placed on members of the 
population in the more productive years of life of supporting 
persons in the relatively unproductive years becomes just a 




SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS STABLE POPULATIONS 
GROSS EXPECTATION CRUDE CRUDE RATE OP PERCENTAGE AT GIVEN AGES DEPENDENCY 
REPRODUCTION OF LIFE AT BIRTH DEATH POPULATION RATIO 
RATE BIRTH RATE RATE INCREASE 0-14 15.59 60+ 5.14 
3-50 45 49.7 19.7 3.0 46.7 49.2 4.0 27.5 103 
3.50 55 48.7 12.7 3.6 48.5 47.5 3.8 28.6 110 
3.50 65 47.3 7.3 4.0 49.4 46.8 3.8 29.2 114 
2.50 55 36.6 13.2 2.3 39.8 53.5 6.8 24.3 87 
2.50 ' 65 36.0 8.2 2.8 40.9 52.4 6.7 25.1 91 
1.75 55 25.8 15.2 1.1 30.6 57.8 11.6 19.4 73 
1.75 65 25.5 10.5 1.5 31.7 56.8 11.6 20.1 76 
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proportions of children and, more directly relevant to 
the present discussion, in the proportions in the primary 
school years, 5 to 14. Similarly, increases in the 
dependency ratio (the number of dependents, 0-14 and 60or 
more per 100 persons in the working years, 15-59) reflect 
the increased burden across the whole age span. It is quite 
plausible to expect that improvements in longevity will 
increase the proportion of dependents by some 10 percent in 
the foreseeable future. Gains in efficiency are to a large 
extent wiped out, then. 
Thus, reductions in mortality afford no relief from 
the sharply disadvantageous age distribution. To the contrary, 
they slightly increase the burden. Investments must continue 
to be made in members of the population who cannot significa-
ntly contribute to increased productivity. A nation such as 
Kenya must continue to develop with a burden of dependency 
which no presently industrialised society has ever had to 
cope with. 
It is also instructive to consider the implications 
of population growth and the age distribution for education 
in terms of the sheer numbers involved, as well as the 
proportions. To do this, an analysis will be adapted from 
the Report of the Population Council Mission to the Kenya 
Government.* 
Consider a population of 10 million with characteristics 
described by line 1 of Table 1. (That is, a population quite 
similar to Kenya's.) There would be 1,5 million children 
5 - 9 years of age-. Assume that the rate of population 
growth rises from 3 percent to 3.5 percent per year over a 
2 5 year period, as would occur if mortality falls at a very 
moderate pace while fertility remains constant. The numbers 
of children 5 - 9 years of age are shown in the first column 
of Table 2, The second column shows the number enrolled in 
school, assuming that 60 percent are enrolled at the outset 
and that the number of students grows 4 percent per year 
through the 25 year period. The third column shows the 
number of children not enrolled in school. It also shows 
that after 25 years of educational expansion, there would 
be 50 percent more children lacking any formal education than 
there was at the outset. 
The rise in the rate of population growth assumed 
in the above analysis is in fact slower than Kenya's current 
progress in mortality reduction implies. Needless to say, 
the more rapid increase in rate of growth which can be 
realistically expected would increase the number of un-
educated much more rapidly. If the rate of growth rose to 
4 percent per year over the same period (that is, if mortality 
fell to the levels not experienced by the industrialized 
nations in 25 years), the number of uneducated would then 
rise to double the number at the outset. 
The preceding paragraphs have explored the 
implications of variations in mortality alone. Let us now 
consider what would happen if fertility also declines. 
* R. Anderson, et al, Report to the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, Republic o~f "Kenya, on 
Population Growth "and Family^Planning" i"n Kenya, 
Unpublished. 
Lines 4 through 7 of Table 1 show the characteristics 
of the stable populations which would result if fertility-
declined along with mortality.* Lines 4 and 5' consider the 
situation if fertility fell by just less than 30 percent; 
lines 6 and 7 if the decline was 50 percent. Both 
possibitities leave fertility and the rate of population 
growth at substantially higher levels than are found in the 
urban-industrial world today. Both projections of decline 
are modest when compared with those taking place in some 
underdeveloped countries today. And both would lead to 
declines in the dependency ratio of at least 20 percent 
under what would be expected if mortality alone changes as 
expected. 
TABLE 2 





NOT IN SCHOOL 
(THOUSANDS) 
0 1,500 900 600 
5 1,740 1,100 640 
10 2,040 1,340 700 
15 2,390 1,630 7.60 
20 2,820 1,990 830 
25 3,330 2,430 900 
Therefore, if a society such as Kenya wishes to reduce 
the burden of welfare costs attendant upon a disadvantageous 
age distribution and thus to increase capital available for 
other more immediately productive forms of investment, 
fertility reduction is essential. Por the formal educational 
institution it can mean a more rapid decrease in the number 
and proportion of those without school - with no added 
investment in the•educational apparatus of the nation. 
Within the family, greater resources can be concentrated on 
fewer individuals. 
Finally, it is relevant to add that fertility 
reduction is a realistic aspiration for Kenya. It has 
already been mentioned that desire for assistance in this 
area appears to be widespread through the population. The 
costs of the kind of national programme which would be likely 
to have a significant impact are not at all impossible. 
Experience in countries currently conducting successful 
national programmes run on the order of Shs.-35 per person 
per year or, generously estimated, some £200,000 per year. 
Foreign assistance is available for this purpose. The cost 
is not negligeable. But, it must be weighed against the 
cost of not engaging in such a programme. 
The implicit age distribution resulting after a change 
in fertility will not be reached at once. Slight 
oscillations in the age distribution will continue to 
be observed for some time. However, for practical 
purposes they damp out quickly and can be ignored. See 
the analysis reported in United Nations, The Aging of 
Populations and its Economic and Social Implications. 
Population Studies, No.26. New YorlTT 1956. 
